

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

Case Numbers: 2026-191123; 2026-193157; 2026-185840; 2026-185934; 2026-191120; 2026-191741; 2026-185842; 2026-185772; 2026-191102; 2026-190675; 2026-185670; 2026-185696; 2026-185723; 2026-191088; 2026-194068; 2026-191845; 2026-185857; 2026-191126; 2026-194239; 2026-192439

(1)	REPORTABLE: YES
(2)	OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)	REVISED: NO
25-08-2026	
DATE	SIGNATURE

In the matter between:

ABIJO MNAMO

ABRAHAM ABUTHE

ASAMO WORKINHE ARMIYAS

ASHENAE DUBIELA AGENO

CHAKISO BEKELE

HARRIS BLONDEL YELENGOUE NYATCHOU

KALITAMO ABEBE ACHEBO

IBRAHIM DARASA

LAWRENCE LOBA

First Applicant

Second Applicant

Third Applicant

Fourth Applicant

Fifth Applicant

Sixth Applicant

Eighth Applicant

Seventh Applicant

Ninth Applicant

MARSHALL LEBEDE

Tenth Applicant

MATHEWOS ESIYS

Eleventh Applicant

NESTOR NIYOKINDA

Twelfth Applicant

OBED LUTUMBA KABEYA

Thirteenth Applicant

PLATINUM MORGAN

Fourteenth Applicant

RARI SANTO

Fifteenth Applicant

RICHARD IFEANYI NKEMKA

Sixteenth Applicant

SADIK RAJABU

Seventeenth Applicant

SALTON MOHAMMED

Eighteenth Applicant

SOLOMON ONISE MELESE

Nineteenth Applicant

WALDO MALAKU

Twentieth Applicant

WONDEMU SADEKO

Twenty-first Applicant

And

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

**THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS**

Second Respondent

**THE CHIEF DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS**

Third Respondent

**THE CHAIRPERSON: REFUGE STATUS
DETERMINATION OFFICER**

Fourth Respondent

**THE CHIEF-DIRECTOR OF DEPORTATIONS;
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS**

Fifth Respondent

THE MANAGEMENT LINDELA HOLDING FACILITY

Sixth Respondent

THE MINISTER OF POLICE

Seventh Respondent

JUDGMENT

MOTHA, J

1. The March and March's loud outcry ABAHAMBE, directed at undocumented foreign nationals, has reverberated across the continent of Africa. Its aftershocks were felt acutely in the Urgent Court, where my roll included nearly 60 urgent applications from undocumented foreign nationals detained for deportation at Lindela Repatriation Centre. Reacting to the lamentations of thousands of South Africans about the exponential increase in undocumented foreign nationals, and perhaps fearing a decline in electoral support, the legislature amended the Refugee Act, thereby heralding a new regime. Unconcerned with electoral fortunes, the Constitutional Court in *Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others*¹ confirmed the Western Cape court's decision that the amendments were inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid, thereby creating a *babelic lacuna*.
2. In *casu*, the applicants are mostly Ethiopian nationals, with a few Congolese and Nigerian nationals. They are all undocumented, and some have been in South Africa since 2020. For one reason or another, none of them have been interviewed by the Refugee Reception Office (RRO), despite seeking asylum. Naturally, they all undertake to make themselves available to the RRO upon release.
3. The Refugees Act 130 of 1998 provides a detailed framework regulating applications for refugee status. The grounds upon which a person may qualify for refugee status are set out in section 3 of the Act. Section 4 of the Act provides for the exclusion from refugee status and section 5 of the Act for the cessation of status. When dealing with asylum seekers in South Africa, the starting point, I dare say, is section 2 of the Refugees Act, which reads:

“Notwithstanding any provision of this Act or any other law to the contrary, no person may be refused entry into the Republic, expelled, extradited or returned to

¹ (CCT126/25) [2026] ZACC 30 (7 July 2026)

any other country or be subject to any similar measure, if as a result of such refusal, expulsion, extradition, return or other measure, such person is compelled to return to or remain in a country where—

(a) he or she may be subjected to persecution on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group; or

(b) his or her life, physical safety or freedom would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or other events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either part or the whole of that country.”

4. Referring to this provision as remarkable, the court in *Ruta v Minister of Home Affairs*² held:

“This is a remarkable provision. Perhaps it is unprecedented in the history of our country’s enactments. It places the prohibition it enacts above any contrary provision of the Refugees Act itself – but also places its provisions above anything in any other statute or legal provision. That is a powerful decree. Practically it does two things. It enacts a prohibition. But it also expresses a principle: that of non-refoulement, the concept that one fleeing persecution or threats to “his or her life, physical safety or freedom” should not be made to return to the country inflicting it.”³

5. Furthermore, the court in *Ruta* articulated the principle of non-refoulement as follows:

“It is a noble principle – one our country, for deep-going reasons springing from persecution of its own people, has emphatically embraced. The provenance of section 2 of the Refugees Act lies in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

² (CCT02/18)[2018] ZACC52; 2019 (3) BCLR383(CC) SA 329 (CC) (20 December 2018)

³ *Supra* para 24.

(Universal Declaration), which guarantees “the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”. The year in which the Universal Declaration was adopted is of anguished significance to our country, for in 1948 the apartheid government came to power. Its mission was to formalise and systematise, with often vindictive cruelty, existing racial subordination, humiliation and exclusion. From then, as apartheid became more vicious and obdurate, our country began to produce a rich flood of its own refugees from persecution, impelled to take shelter in all parts of the world, but especially in other parts of Africa. That history looms tellingly over any understanding we seek to reach of the Refugees Act.

The principle of protecting refugees from persecution was elaborated three years after the Universal Declaration, in article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (1951 Convention). This gave substance to article 14 of the Universal Declaration. The 1951 Convention defined “refugees”, while codifying non refoulement. South Africa as a constitutional democracy became a State Party to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol when it acceded to both of them on 12 January 1996 – which it did without reservation. In doing so, South Africa embraced the principle of non-refoulement as it has developed since 1951. The principle has been a cornerstone of the international law regime on refugees. It has also become a deeply-lodged part of customary international law and is considered part of international human rights law. As refugees put agonising pressure on national authorities and on national ideologies in Europe, North America, and elsewhere, the response to these principles of African countries, including our own, is of profound importance.”⁴

6. Following the amendments that took effect in January 2020, a new regime came into existence; Regulation 2(2) was abrogated. The new regime was underpinned by ss4(1)(f), 4(1)(h), 4(1)(i), 21(1B), Regulations 7 and 8. For the sake of completeness, it is imperative to refer to these sections and regulations, which read:

“Exclusion from refugee status

⁴ Supra paras 25 and 26.

4. (1) An asylum seeker does not qualify for refugee status for the purposes of this Act if a Refugee Status Determination Officer has reason to believe that he or she:

(f) has committed an offence in relation to the fraudulent possession, acquisition or presentation of a South African identity card, passport, travel document, temporary residence visa or permanent residence permit; or

(h) having entered the Republic, other than through a port of entry designated as such by the Minister in terms of section 9A of the Immigration Act, fails to satisfy a Refugee Status Determination Officer that there are compelling reasons for such entry; or

(i) has failed to report to the Refugee Reception Office within five days of entry into the Republic as contemplated in section 21, in the absence of compelling reasons, which may include hospitalisation, institutionalisation or any other compelling reason: Provided that this provision shall not apply to a person who, while being in the Republic on a valid visa, other than a visa issued in terms of section 23 of the Immigration Act, applies for asylum.”

7. Section 21(1B) reads:

“An applicant who may not be in possession of an asylum transit visa as contemplated in section 23 of the Immigration Act, must be interviewed by an immigration officer to ascertain whether valid reasons exist as to why the applicant is not in possession of such visa.”

8. Regulation 7 reads:

“7. Asylum transit visa

Any person who intends to apply for asylum must declare his or her intention, while at a port of entry, before entering the Republic and provide his or her biometrics and other relevant data as required, including—(a) fingerprints;(b) photograph;(c) names and surname;(d) date of birth and age;(e) nationality or origin;

and(f)habitual place of residence prior to travelling to the Republic. And must be issued with an asylum transit visa contemplated in section 23 of the Immigration Act.”

9. In relevant parts, Regulation 8 provides:

“Application for asylum

(1)An application for asylum in terms of section 21 of the Act must—(a)be made in person by the applicant upon reporting to a Refugee Reception Office or on a date allocated to such a person upon reporting to the Refugee Reception Office;(b)be made in a form substantially corresponding with Form 2 (DHA-1590) contained in the Annexure;(c)be submitted together with—(i)a valid asylum transit visa issued at a port of entry in terms of section 23 of the Immigration Act, or under permitted circumstances, a valid visa issued in terms of the Immigration Act;(ii)proof of any form of a valid identification document: Provided that if the applicant does not have proof of a valid identification document, a declaration of identity must be made in writing before an immigration officer; and(iii)the biometrics of the applicant, including any dependant...”

10.Of paramount importance is that Regulation 2(2) of the old regime was not retained. The regulation read:

“Any person who entered the Republic and is encountered in violation of the Aliens Control Act, who has not submitted an application pursuant to sub-regulation 2(1), but indicates an intention to apply for asylum shall be issued with an appropriate permit valid for 14 days within which they must approach a Refugee Reception Office to complete an asylum application.”

11.In a nutshell, the new regime grappled with three vexed questions:

1. What happens when a foreign national does not enter South Africa through the designated ports of entry, in short, enters illegally?
 2. What happens when a foreign national does not present himself before the RRO or within five days as contemplated in the asylum transit visa?
 3. What happens when an undocumented foreign national has lived in South Africa for years and, upon arrest, expresses an intention to apply for asylum?
12. Under the new regime, Regulation 7 requires an individual to declare their intention to apply for asylum at the port of entry before entering South Africa. If eligible, they/she/he will be issued an Asylum Transit Visa in terms of s 23 of the Immigration Act.
13. Since South Africa's borders are porous, thousands enter the country and stay undocumented for years. When such an individual presents himself/herself/themselves to the RRO, Regulation 8(3) requires "any person who upon application for asylum fails at a Refugee Reception Office to produce a valid visa issued in terms of the Immigration Act must prior to being permitted to apply for asylum, **show good cause** for his or her illegal entry or stay in the Republic as contemplated in Article 31(1) of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees" (Emphasis added).
14. This marked a radical departure from the status quo ante under the old Regulation 2(2). Section 21(1B) works in tandem with Regulation 8(3), which provides that "an applicant who may not be in possession of an asylum transit visa as contemplated in section 23 of the Immigration Act, must be interviewed by an immigration officer to ascertain whether **valid reasons exist** as to why the applicant is not in possession of such visa." (Emphasis added).

15. What happens if the person is brought to court and expresses an intention to apply for asylum? In that instance, it is noteworthy that Regulation 8(4) provides: “A judicial officer must require any foreigner appearing before the court, who indicates his or her intention to apply for asylum, to **show good cause** as contemplated in subregulation.” (Emphasis added)

Post-Scalabrini regime.

16. The latest ruling on these predicaments is *Scalabrini*. Before *Scalabrini*, *Ashebo v Minister of Home Affairs and Others*⁵ was the last word on these predicaments. Although it addressed the issue of *sur place*, the court in *Director-General, Department of Home Affairs and Others v Irankunda and Another*⁶ was about the following question:

“However, before doing so I pause to remark on what this case is about. It is only about whether the Act, properly interpreted, creates the right for a failed asylum seeker to make subsequent applications.”⁷

17. Therefore, *Scalabrini* remains the last, though I suspect not the final, word on these predicaments. Interestingly, some of the Justices who concurred in *Ashebo*, decided in 2023, dealt with *Scalabrini* in 2026. *Ex facie*, it therefore seems counterintuitive that in 2024 the court in *Ashebo* would hold:

“It is clear, therefore, that the combined effect of the amended provisions in sections 4(1)(h) and (i) and 21(1B) of the Refugees Amendment Act and regulations 7 and 8(3) is to provide an illegal foreigner, who intends to apply for asylum but who did not arrive at a port of entry and express his or her intention there, with a means to evince the intention even after the five-day period

⁵ (CCT 250/22) [2023] ZACC 16; 2023 (5) SA 382 (CC); 2024 (2) BCLR 217 (CC) (12 June 2023).

⁶ (CCT 214/24) [2026] ZACC 18; 2026 (7) BCLR 682 (CC); 2026 (4) SA 603 (CC) (12 May 2026).

⁷ *Supra* para 61.

contemplated in section 23 of the Immigration Act. The illegal foreigner does so during an interview with an immigration officer at which they must show good cause for their illegal entry or stay in the country and furnish good reasons why they do not possess an asylum transit visa, before they are allowed to apply for asylum.”⁸

18. More importantly, the court would conclude:

“In my view, these provisions do not offend the principle of non-refoulement embodied in section 2 of the Refugees Act. Their effect is by no means out of kilter with article 31 of the Convention, the fount of section 2. Rather, they accord with its import because it too does not provide an asylum seeker with unrestricted indemnity from penalties. The article provides that a Contracting State may not impose penalties on refugees on account of their illegal entry or presence in the country provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”⁹

19. And two years and a few months later, the Constitutional Court, in *Scalabrini*, would assert that the court in *Ashebo* “was not condoning non-compliance with the non-refoulement principle at all...”¹⁰

20. Explicating its comment, the court, in *Scalabrini*, maintained that:

“Equally misconceived is the respondents’ reliance on this *obiter dictum* (comment in passing) in *Ashebo*:

“In my view, these provisions do not offend the principle of non-refoulement embodied in section 2 of the Refugees Act. Their effect is by no means out of kilter with Article 31 of the [1951 Refugee] Convention, the fount of section 2.”¹¹

⁸ *Ashebo* para 43

⁹ *Ashebo* para 44

¹⁰ *Scalabrini* para 84.

¹¹ *Supra* para 83.

21. To me, with respect, the two cannot coexist. Be that as it may, the court, in *Scalabrini*, continued and expressed itself as follows:

“When section 21(1B) is read together with regulation 8(3), the practical effect of that section is plainly to prevent an asylum seeker from proceeding to a merits-based determination.”¹²

22. It is noteworthy that the court did not elucidate what a merits-based determination means, especially for the benefit of the lower courts which are on the front lines. It has proven to be an exorbitant exercise to second-guess what the Apex Court means by this or that legal terminology.

23. In *Scalabrini*, the court critiqued the new regime and zeroed in on a few pitfalls, including the following:

“Regulation 8(3) thus fleshes out and gives effect to the purpose of section 21(1B) and is the only mechanism that makes section 21(1B) a workable provision.

On that approach, it is evident that section 21(1B), read with regulation 8(3), establishes two distinct thresholds. Section 21(1B) requires an applicant to show valid reasons to the immigration officer for not being in possession of an asylum transit visa. Regulation 8(3) requires good cause to be shown (and, in passing, it must be added, it is not clear to whom this has to be shown) for illegal entry or stay.”¹³

24. Furthermore, the court criticised the new regime as conferring unguided discretion and being impermissibly vague because the regulation is silent on or fails to pinpoint the functionary or decision-maker who is charged with the responsibility of conducting the interview.

¹² Supra para 85.

¹³ Supra paras 85 and 86.

25. Indignant at the requirement that asylum seekers may face “the same questions two or three times, and show “good cause” or “valid reasons” to one (or perhaps two) officials, but “compelling reasons” to another.” The court, in *Scalabrini*, branded the new regime absurd and held:

“It is self-evidently, inherently problematic that different thresholds are applied to what is, in substance, the same inquiry. The use of multiple and escalating standards creates uncertainty as to which test applies, when it applies and by whom it must be applied, thereby rendering the scheme internally inconsistent and unpredictable in its operation.”¹⁴

26. Additionally, the court bemoaned the failure to define words such as “good cause”, “valid reasons” or “compelling reasons.” Importantly, the court decried the absence of a principled framework for decision-making which would assist in distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable explanations.

27. Essentially, the court pointed out that the “compelling reasons” test in section 4(1)(h), the “valid reasons” test in section 21(1B) and the “good cause” test in regulation 8(3) have no guidance whatsoever.” Consequently, this conferred unjustifiably broad discretion, resulting in a real risk of arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making.

28. The final nail in the coffin for the new regime was the conclusion that s21(1B), read with regulation 8(3), is irrational. Given that regulation 8 had been struck down by the Western Cape Court, the court held that, absent the regulations, s21(1B), on its own, was meaningless and therefore irrational, as it served no discernible purpose.

29. From the tenor of the judgment, it would not be far-fetched to surmise that the court sought to resurrect the Regulation 2(2) era. What cements this view is the court’s

¹⁴ Supra para 88.

remarks that “there is no justifiable basis why asylum seekers should be disbarred from applying based on procedural missteps...In addition, the amended scheme introduces arbitrary distinctions that did not exist prior to the amendments.”¹⁵

30. Stripped of legalese, the court, in my view, is stating that illegal entry into the Republic and failure to report to RRO, including remaining undocumented in the Republic for years at times, constitute procedural missteps.

31. In the real world, the court asserted under 21(1B) that when the Refugee Status Determination Office (RSDO) found no compelling reasons for the delay in reporting, the applicant is altogether prevented from entering the asylum process; instead of being given written reasons and a right of appeal to the Refugee Appeal Authority (RAA).

32. The court concluded that “apart from opacity, absurdity, unconstrained and unguided discretion and irrationality, section 21(1B) also infringes the non-refoulement principle.”¹⁶

33. Without carving out a new interim regime, the court might as well have resurrected Regulation 2(2). The reality is that the lower courts are caught in a Catch-22, damned if they rule to release and damned if they rule otherwise. To me, it is the height of folly to arrest undocumented foreign nationals for being undocumented and then release them back into society still undocumented, to face re-arrest. The expression of an intention to apply for asylum is no reason to release an undocumented foreign national back into society under the hope that within ten (10) or fifteen (15) days of their release, they will present themselves to the RRO to apply for asylum. This catch-and-release regime is undignified, perpetuates corruption and exposes foreign nationals to financial exploitation.

¹⁵ Supra para 94.

¹⁶ Supra para 97.

34. In my view, the perspicuous comments of Maya DCJ, as she then was, in *Ashebo* are not only sound but must also be heeded and followed:

“To sum up, the applicant is entitled to an opportunity to be interviewed by an immigration officer to ascertain whether there are valid reasons why he is not in possession of an asylum transit visa. And he must, prior to being permitted to apply for asylum, show good cause for his illegal entry and stay in the country, as contemplated in the above provisions. Once he passes that hurdle and an application for asylum is lodged, the entitlements and protections provided in sections 22 and 21(4) of the Refugees Act – being issued with an asylum seeker permit that will allow him to remain in the country, without delay, and being shielded from proceedings in respect of his unlawful entry into and presence in the country until his application is finally determined – will be available to him.

Once the applicant has an asylum seeker visa issued in terms of section 22, he would be entitled to remain in this country temporarily. His continued detention, to the extent that it rests solely on section 34 of the Immigration Act, would unquestionably become unlawful, because he would no longer be an “illegal foreigner” for purposes of the Immigration Act. Merely expressing an intention to seek asylum does not entitle the applicant to release from detention. On the other hand, however, the respondents, particularly the first, second, fourth, and fifth are obliged – regardless of the basis of his detention – to assist him to give effect to his intention to apply for asylum. At a practical level, this simply means that these respondents must facilitate arrangements either to transport the applicant to a RRO for his interview or to bring the relevant immigration and refugee officials to the correctional centre in which he is detained to conduct the necessary processes, whichever means is convenient. They must further refrain from deporting him until his asylum application is finalised.”¹⁷

35. Despite the seriousness of the issues and the number of applicants, the Department of Home Affairs was a no-show in court until the court insisted on their

¹⁷ *Ashebo* paras 59 and 60


presence. After their appearance in court, the matters were properly ventilated. However, the immigration issue is too serious to be treated in this manner.

36. It bears mentioning that all the applicants' representatives and the respondents' representatives submitted that it would be prudent to address these issues in a manner that is in line with the statements of Maya DCJ.
37. Having listened to all submissions from the legal representatives of the parties who opted to proceed with the applications, it became evident and most concerning that, when these matters are heard, the views of organizations such as Dudula and March and March are not before the court, despite representing a sizeable sector of South African society. It appears that the voice of the most resourced carries the day. The views and opinions of certain well-resourced NGOs and NPOs are always taken on board, perhaps rightly so. Ultimately, it is imperative that courts avoid an echo chamber at all costs. To ignore the views of the impoverished and downtrodden members of the society does not auger well for the future, to say the least.
38. Finally, I must express my gratitude to the Director in charge of the Tshwane Refugee Reception Office, Mr. Mfundo Ngozwana. His assertions were sound, particularly the undertaking to broach the subject of establishing a Refugee Reception Office at or near the Lindela Repatriation Centre.
39. It is trite that costs follow the results. In *casu*, I do not find any reason to depart from that well-trodden path. In the result, I make the following order:

Order

1. The Applicants' non-compliance with Uniform Rules of Court relating to form, service and time periods is condoned and the matter is heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12).

2. Pending the outcome of the Applicants' asylum applications, the Respondents are interdicted and restrained from deporting the Applicants.
3. The Respondents are directed to transport the relevant immigration and refugee officials to Lindela Repatriation Center to conduct the necessary processes; if unable to do so, transport the applicants to the nearest Refugee Reception Office for processing.
4. The Respondents are to pay jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, the costs of all the applicants on a party and party scale A.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'MP Motha', is written over a black rectangular redaction box.

**MP MOTHA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG**

Appearances

Date of Hearing	:	18 and 21 August 2026
Date of Judgment	:	25 August 2026
For Applicants in matters 5;22;32;33& 42	:	Adv N. F. Chauke
Instructed by	:	Sawall Attorneys
For Applicants in matters 2;17;30;39; &40	:	Adv N. Pama-Sihunu
Instructed by	:	Chokoe Attorneys
For Applicants in matters 3 & 27	:	Adv Tandoh Desmond
Instructed by	:	Attorneys
For Applicants in matter 50	:	Adv I. Nwakodo
Instructed by	:	Tony Okorie Attorneys
For Applicants in matters 10;12;28;29;34;35;38&43	:	Adv G. Mothemane
Instructed by	:	Mashimbye Attorneys
For Respondent	:	Adv K. Mabuza
Instructed by	:	The State Attorney

URGENT COURT ROLL (17th TO THE 21st August 2026)

PRESIDING JUDGE	JUDGE'S CLERK	EMAIL & OFFICE TEL:
MOTHA J	FIKILE LEREMI	<u>FLeremi@judiciary.org.za</u> 010 494 8334

No	Cas No	Parties' Names
1	26-189244	4 EVERGREEN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS (PTY) LTD v. MOGALE CITY LOCAL MUNICIPALITY # 2026-189244
2	26-191123	ABIJO MNAMO v. MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-191123
3	26-193157	ABRAHAM ABUTHE v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS AND 5 OTHERS
4	26-190470	AKILILU ASHETU v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-190470
5	26-190451	ALEX BIHI v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-190451
6	26-190774	ALI SHUCEB v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-190774 #
7	26-182827	AMAN MIAN MOHAMMED v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
8	26-189122	AMERON ENERGIES AG v. SIGEO HOLDINGS PROPRIETARY LIMITED
9	26-192470	AMNEL AMNEL v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-192470
10	26-185840	ASAMO WORKINHE ARMIYAS v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
11	26-191523	ASHANAF DOMBALO DANTISO v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
12	26-185934	ASHENAE DUBIELA AGENO v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-185934
13	26-192873	Bamade . Jamal v. The Minister of Home affairs # 2026-192873
14	26-192877	Bejoko . Melaku v. The Minister of Home affairs # 2026-192877
15	26-185469	CAHIRNET MUSI v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
16	26-193903	CEDERIC NKURUZIZA v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-193903
17	26-191120	CHAKISO BEKELE v. MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-191120 #
18	26-193940	CHIEMEKA EKECHUKWU OBASI v. MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-193940
19	26-182600	CORNELL MAJARA MONYAKE v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

20	26-185516	DANIEL HALIZE MARMAM v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
21	26-182611	DAVID CRUZ VIERA v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-182611 #
22	26-190681	DAWIT KASSA v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-190681 #
23	26-192456	DAWIT GEBRE ARFICHO v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-192456
24	26-186337	Faith Tumelo Komape v. E-Joburg Retirement Fund -Administered by Momentum # 2026-186337 #
25	26-194016	FLORENCE EKECHUKWU DARKO v. MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-194016
26	26-190656	GUMI ZELEKE GASHE v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-190656
27	26-191741	HARRIS BLONDEL YELENGOUE NYATCHOU v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS AND 7 OTHERS # 2026-191741
28	26-185842	IBRAHIM DARASA v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-185842
29	26-185772	KALITAMO ABEBE ACHEBO v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-185772
30	26-191102	LAWRENCE LOBA v. MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-191102
31	26-192373	LINDA LOUISA GXASHEKA v. CITY OF EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY # 2026-192373
32	26-190675	MARSHALL LEBEDE v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-190675
33	26-191632	MATHEWOS ESIYS v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-191632
34	26-185670	NESTOR NIYOKINDA v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-185670 #
35	26-185696	OBED LUTUMBA KABEYA v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-185696 #
36	26-19407	PATRICK NTUZENIMANA v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-194076
37	26-189311	peter paulos moloko monyepao v. city of ekurhuleni metropolitan municipality
38	26-185723	PLATINUM MORGAN v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-185723
39	26-191088	RARI SANTO v. MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-191088
40	26-194068	RICHARD IFEANYI NKEMKA v. MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-194068
41	26-182840	ROHMAN RIZWAN v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

42	26-191845	SADIK RAJABU v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-191845 #
43	26-185857	SALTON MOHAMMED v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-185857
44	26-182586	SAMUEL NAWAB v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
45	26-192492	SELFU TIRE v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-192492 #
46	26-190781	SISAYE TAMIRAT v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-190781
47	26-191126	SOLOMON ONISE MELESE v. MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-191126 #
48	26-185532	TESHUME KEMISO v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
49	25-238970	THE SOUTHERN AFRICA FUJIAN OVERSEAS CHINESE ASSOCIATION v. THE SOUTHERN AFRICA FUJIAN OVERSEAS CHINESE ASSOCIATION # 2025-238970
50	26-194239	WALDO MALAKU v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-194239 #
51	26-192439	WONDEMU SADEKO v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-192439
52	26-193440	Yonwaba Gcaba v. National Students Financial Aid Scheme # 2026-193440
53	26-194228	ZAMA ABDUL v. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS # 2026-194228